Research
My work addresses a critical lacuna: the absence of anarchist theoretical viewpoints in mainstream political philosophy. Though anarchists are well-represented in disciplines such as anthropology, sociology, and history, and although anarchists outside of academia are always thinking, writing, and discussing, within the field of philosophy, anarchists are conspicuously under-represented, and their works remain widely unread.
When they are allowed in, anarchist concepts easily find a place in political philosophy. Yet anarchist themes also can be read alongside less straightforwardly political notions, such as those of Hegelianism, phenomenology, existentialism, pragmatism, and post-structuralism. The investigation of these fruitful crossroads, unfortunately, is given little attention in the academy.
My work centers on the philosophical investigation of hierarchy and its relation to anarchist thought. I am mostly interested in “hierarchy” as it applies to human societies. Various political, economic, and social systems are sometimes labeled as “hierarchies” or as “hierarchical.” I investigate what these systems and structures have in common, whether they are just or unjust, and why.
I think that anarchism is a societal ideology, one that is best understood as a general skepticism of all hierarchies in society, but an outright opposition only to the broadest and deepest hierarchical “macro-systems.” In my writings, I argue that “hierarchy” is the core concept of anarchist theory, because it helps to relate all of the other important anarchist concepts to each other.
At base, my work suggests that it is by thinking about hierarchies, and about what is wrong (or sometimes right!) with them, that all of us — anarchists and non-anarchists — can begin to construct new institutions, structures, and systems that best promote the values we hold most dear: liberty, equality, and compassion.
What is 'Hierarchy'? Is it Right or Wrong?
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A recent book by Niko Kolodny, The Pecking Order, makes the case that societal hierarchies deserve more attention than they have been given in political philosophy hitherto, and explores the descriptive and moral implications of societal hierarchies. Though a pathbreaking work, Kolodny’s elaboration is nevertheless flawed in several key respects. First, Kolodny’s descriptive approach to societal hierarchies lacks an account of ‘structure’. In response, I theorize several levels of ‘structurality’, and argue for the existence of ‘interactional hierarchies’, ‘meso-structural hierarchies’, and ‘macro-structural hierarchies.’ Second, Kolodny neglects the moral notion of a “collective inferiority complaint”. To address this, I tie together several unconnected strands of thought in Kolodny’s text that imply that natural individuals have a collective moral claim against finding themselves in macro-structural relations of inferiority. Third, Kolodny attempts to justify the State and the capitalist firm through a series of “tempering factors” that allegedly mollify the societal hierarchies that these phenomena involve. I demonstrate that Kolodny’s “secondary” tempering factors are aimed at addressing meso-structural offices, only, and that they are insufficient to render even these morally un-objectionable. Further, I show they are not robust enough to meet our collective moral complaint against macro-structural relations of inferiority. Fourth and finally, I argue that anarchism offers a better alternative to a Kolodnian account of societal hierarchies. Anarchist philosophy provides additional tempering factors that render meso-structural hierarchies morally un-objectionable, and that transform macro-structural hierarchies into something else entirely. I theorize the contrast class to societal hierarchies: ‘interactional horizontalities’, ‘meso-structural horizontalities’, and ‘macro-structural horizontalities’. I conclude that anarchism is best understood as an ideology that is: skeptical of all societal hierarchies, opposed only to macro-structural hierarchies, open to all societal horizontalities, and dedicated to macro-structural horizontalities. I suggest that this understanding of anarchism not only helps to complete Kolodny’s project, but also to resolve ongoing disputes in anarchist studies.​
Envisioning the Future, Envisioning Utopia
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In this paper, I use insights from post-structuralist anarchism to consider the relationship between a sense of the future, or “futurity”, and the notion of utopia for anarchist movements. At issue is whether anarchism requires a vision or sense of the future at all and, if so, whether that futurity should be utopian. Drawing from the post-structuralist anarchism of Todd May, Saul Newman, and Lewis Call, I consider the problems with utopia, as well as the potential irrelevance or impossibility of even thinking the future. I then argue for the necessity of both and contend that post-structuralist anarchism does not preclude either futurity or provisional forms of utopia. I conclude by sketching the outlines of a utopia that would be acceptably post-structuralist and acceptably anarchist.
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